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ABSTRACT 
or&: audit fees, non-audit fees, banking sector. 
ch on non-audit fees is becoming important given its potential effect on audit independence 
1997). Recently, the Enron scandal in the United States had bristled with a host of revelations 
the auditing leading the company to its demise. Andersen, the auditor of Enron was heavily 
sed for its collapse. Such criticism was levelled against Andersen because it is alleged to 
nhate more on non-audit services rather than audit. In 1998, Andersen's total worldwide 
- 
revenue for non-audit services was US$ 3216.8 million as compared with US$ 2,876.6 million only 
for audit (Andersen, 1998)~' Andersen's total worldwide revenue had grown by about 13 percent 
annually since 1990 (Andersen, 1998). One of the reasons given by h d e r s e n  was the growth in new 
services they provided other than audit services. 
In the United States, the challenge faced by the audit firms nowadays is the increasing reluctance of 
their clients to purchase both consulting and aydit services from the same firms (The S ~ a r ,  2002). 
addition, they have to deal with an onslaught of new laws heaped on them by regulators, which among 
other things, discourage them from selling non-audit services to the clients they audit. Auditors have 
also been criticised by the public in the Enron scandal because of the lack of independence in auditing 
their clients due to its long tenure. For that reason, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has 
requisitioned all banks incorporated in Singapore to change their audit firms every five years under a 
revised ruling. The new audit requirement is one of a series of control measures on corporate 
governance introduced by the Singapore authorities (The Star, 2002). In Malaysia, however, there is 
no regulation for the banks to change the audit firms within a certain period. 
Auditors are agents of the shareholders whose interests are considered different to those of the 
managers of the companies audited (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). That is why there was a suggestion , 
for the disclosure of non-audit fees in published accounts in Malaysia to protect shareholders' 
interests (Teoh and Lim, 1996). It is one of the tools to minimize agency cost between managers and 
shareholders. Many British Commonwealth countries have made it a requirement that audit fees of 
listed companies be disclosed, and in Australia and the UK, consultancy fees paid to the auditor for 
non-audit work must also be published in the annual report (Firth, 1997). 
The purpose of this paper is to add to the empirical literature on audit pricing by examining audit fees , 
and non-audit fees paid to audit firms in the banking sector in Malaysia. The banking sector is chosen - 
because it is a highly regulated sector and rarely being examined by the audit researchers. Whilst there 
studies that looked on the perception of the shareholders, managers and auditors (Gul and Teoh, 1986; 
Teoh and Lim, 1996), none has specifically examined the relationship between non-audit services fees " 
and audit fees. 
Background of Bankirtg Sector 
In Malaysia, "bank" means an establishment that is engaged among others in the business of receiving 
deposits on current account, deposit account, savings account or other similar accounts and paying or t  
collecting cheques drawn by or paid in by  customer^.^ The banking sector plays a very important role 
in the development of the Malaysian economy. A strong banking sector is a prerequisite for 
sustainable economic growth. The sector is given a lot of incentives in taking part in the development 
of the economy. However, due to the economic crisis when began in the third quarter of 1997, the 
government has directed that only 10 anchor banks to be around in the ensuing years.3 The 
consolidation of domestic banking institutions into 10 banking groups is supposed to strengthen the' 
nation's banking sector. 
I Malaysian Institute Accountant By Law (On Professional Conduct and Ethics) (revised 2002), suggested *f 
audit firms should not accept any appointment if they provide non-audit services, if the provision of non-audf 
services would create a significant threat to the professional independence, integrity and objectivity of the sud' 
firms. 
2 See Section 1 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) 1989 for a comprehensive definition O 
bank. 
3 Local banks were directed to merge before the end of 2000, however until  2002; there are still 1 I anchor ba" 
in Malaysia. 
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&ground of Non-Audit Services in Malaysia 
p e r a l ,  audit firms provide non-audit services such as tax consultancy, systems consultancy, 
anagement advice, international business advice, human resources management, and financial and 
vestment consultancies (Firth, 1997). In addition, in the banking sector, they provide due diligence 
d restructuring consultation necessitated by mergers or acquisitions. 
at consultancy fees made up 20 to 30 percent of their total revenues and the trend is likely to be on 
ators as well as by commentators from the accounting profession. This issue had directly 
ted the accounting profession in Malaysia as well. 
THE MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
most important factor that motivated the authors to carry out this study is the recent corporate 
revealed that non-audit fees significantly determined audit fees but these studies are conducted 
reign settings (Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; and Firth, 1997). Moreover, the results in those 
eS were not consistent with the theory. 
e Present study, the authors examine this issue in the local setting namely Malaysian banks. To 
reports as nil. Instead, the authors look for theses amounts by asking the banks to complete th 
questionnaires. 
Hopefilly, this study will result with new understanding about the auditing market in Malaysi 
Finally, it is hoped that the results can be used by the banking sector to improve both the effectivene 
and efficiency of the audit that they undertake and their relationship with the auditors in gaining 
public trust. 
111. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
As mentioned earlier, only two Malaysian studies that examined the relationship betwee" non.aud 
fees and audit fees (Mohd Atef and Ayoib, 2000; and Ayoib, 2001), while other studies (see Gu] an 
Teoh, 1986; and Teoh and Lim, 1996) are concerned about the perception of the stakeholden wi 
regard to this issue. Thus, the objectives of this study are: 
I. To examine non-audit services and its effects on audit fees in banking sector archival 
data, which are arguably more accurate and reliable. 
2. To add input to the body of knowledge on current situations of non-audit fees and audit 
fees In auditing literature using the banking sector which is always excluded in analysis 
3. To determine the factors influencing the audit fees in different settings (i.e developin 
country) using the well-established model of audit pricing. 
This study illustrates the situation regarding provision of non-audit fees on the audit fees in Malaysl 
using the recent data from the banking sector (i.e. 1999 annual reports). 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The next section highlights the relevant literatu 
on audit fees. Section 5 provides the theoretical rationale and develops the hypothesis. Section 
describes the research design and sample selection. Section 7 reports and discusses the results 
finally, Section 8 states the concluding remarks. 
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Audit Fees 
There are a number of previous studies addressing the issue relating to audit fees and determinants 
audit fees including non-audit fees. Previous researchers used various settings in inve 
determinants of audit fees (Firth, 1997). Simunic (1980) began the studies on audit fees by de 
a model that includes factors representing client size, complexities and risk which explain 
variation in audit fees. Subsequently, in the regression analysis, Simunic found that auditee 
complexity and risk were related to audit fees. In addition, he found that no relationships 
between audit fees and the Big Eight auditors in both large and small auditee markets. Later, si 
studies were undertaken in countries such as the United Kingdom (Chan, et al; 1993; and Pan 
Whittington, 1994) and Australia (Butterworth and Houghton, 1995; and Craswell et a]., 1995). 
studies used archival data and the regression analyses were employed. However most of 
excluded the finance companies especially the banks despite their importance to the economy. 
Auditee Size 
The most determinant factor of audit fees is the auditee size, which is usually measured by 
assets. In addition, Pong and Whittington (1994) also found that the total sales are relevant to 
audit fees. The size of auditee has a direct impact on the auditors' work and numerous literature 
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alyses. Sample of the companies were from the voluntarily disclosed audit fees data in SEC filings, 
icfly the proxy statements4 
t risks also have a significant positive relationship with audit fees due to the fact that the auditors 
to do more work to eliminate any potential litigation against the auditors. Palmrose (1986a), 
1 and Taylor (1991) found evidence of industry specialisation among Australian audit firms. 
specialisation occurred when many contractual influences such as reputation, similarities of 
ments of fees billed by companies' financial statement auditors. The 
categories: a) annual audit and quarterly reviews; b) financial information 
, and c) all other services. 
. 
client create a demand for a specific set of skills, which enhances auditor competence (Craswell 
Taylor, 1991). They suggested that product differentiation among auditors represents a signifi 
consideration in explaining the market structure of auditing. Therefore, audit quality is not only 
general brand name of auditors as defined by De Angelo (1981) when auditor discovers a breach 
report the breach. However, it also consists of multiple attributes such as audit specialisation to 
the value of audit quality. Audit fees data for companies listed on Australian Stock Exchanges dunn 
the period 1982 to 1987 were used by this study. The two-digit code of Australian Stock Exchange 
classification was selected and the data from annual reports were drawn. The study adopted 
approaches related to some specified absolute market share and relative to the share of olhe 
companies. Further study by Craswell et al. (1995) using 1,484 Australian pubhc listed companie 
found that, on the average, the Big Eight auditors which are industry specialists earn a 34% premiu 
over non specialist Big Eight auditors, and the Big Eight brand name premium over non-Big Eig 
auditors averaged around 30%. 
Furthermore, Defond et al. (2000) indicated that there were premiums for both general brand "a 
and for industry specialisation in Big Six. They examined the audit fees for 1992 public lis 
companies (excluding finance industry) in Hong Kong. The data were drawn from annual reporb and 
regression analyses were used. The results suggested that Big Six brand-name reputation is 
necessary foundation in which to achieve higher priced quality-differentiated audit based on industrv 
specialisation. 
Multinational 
Studies by Rose (1999) and Ayoib (2001) in the Malaysian market showed that multinational fi 
were charged higher fees than local firms. Rose investigated audit fee determinants in Malaysia an 
Hong Kong. She used the audit fee models developed in prior literature such as Simunic (1980). 
models were analysed by means of Ordinary Least Squares regression and run separately for 
country. The sample was collected from Worldscope Compacr Disclosure, Moody's Comp 
Infernafional and the Lexis/Nexis database for the year 1995. Similarly, Ayoib (2001) used th 
percentage of  foreign ownership and found the variable to be highly significant in explaining th 
variability of audit fees. 
NonrAudit Fees 
It was argued that a negative relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees would happen du 
the trade off between audit and non-audit services (NAS) works (Simunic, 1984). This result from 
knowledge spillover effects whereby the benefits from the NAS may subsequently be passed on to 
companies by reducing the audit fees. Another explanation of this negative relationship is that th 
audit is used as a "loss leader" to obtain the more lucrative consultancy works. The effect reduces 
audit fees and subsequently the audit firms increase the non-audit services fees to capture the "loss 
(Hillison and Kennelley, 1988). This would also occur if the audit firms expect to avoid a dismissal b 
reducing the audit fees and then recoup the loss by increasing the non-audit services fees. 
Despite these theories, many empirical studies found that the non-audit fees were positive 
significantly related to the audit fees (Palmrose, 1986b; Simunic, 1984; Euamel, et al., 1996; an 
Firth, 1999). Similarly, Firth (2002) found that, there is positive association between consultancY 
and audit fees using the United Kingdom sample. He used the data from a sample of 3 14 UK q* 
companies and replicated the Firth's (1997) model. He explained that this might be due to spec 
events in the company that generate a demand for consultancy services as well as requiring addi 
audit effort. Examples of specific events are mergers and acquisitions, share issues, implementat 
new accounting and information systems, appointment of new CEOs, and corporate resmc 
However, when these events are absent, there is no statistically significant relationship between 
fees and consultancy fees after controlling for company size. 
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paudit fees would be seen. 
tween audit fees and non-audit fees exists in the Australian market. They used cross sectional data 
1987 and 1988 and regressed the audit fees model using the Ordinary Least Squares procedure. 
e data came from a computerised database of the annual reports of 433 Western Australia- 
ntants. Their results show that inadequate disclosure of non-audit fees, management 
ltancy service fees are in excess of 50% of total audit fees and retention of auditors for over five 
will reflect lower independence. It is not the purpose of the present study to analyse the 
V. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
us, there are two possible relationships between non-audit fees and audit fees. The negative 
e on non-audit fees than audit fees since consultancy might be thought to be more beneficial 
rganizations than the annual statutory audit. As for the loss leader effect, the audit f i m s  would 
lower audit fees to retain their'clients and then charge higher fees on non-audit fees to recover 
. Hence, a negative relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees would prevail. 
There is no significant relationship between audit fees and 
non-audit fees. 
VI. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
Sample and Data 
A total population of 47 banks was selected in the year after the economic crisis, i.e. year 1999. out 
a total of 47 banks, 33 of them are local banks, while 14 are foreign banks. And out of47 banks, 
are 35 commercial banks and 12 merchant banks. It was appropriate to use the data for the year 1 
because previous studies by Mohd Atef and Ayoib (2000), and Ayoib (2001) used the data prior 
economic crisis in 1997. Also, the period was chosen because it was the year before the b 
merger among banks took place in the year 2000. In addition, the period was suitable as it was 
the year when Malaysia had just recovered from the economic downturn in mid-1997.j 
The sample comprised of all local and foreign banks that appear on the Bankers Directory 2000. Nex 
a short questionnaire was distributed to all the headquarters of the banks by personal-visit to the ba 
to solicit the data on non-audit services fee. A total of 10 usable responses were returned including 
responses on merger data.6 Thus, the final sample used for this analysis was 3 1 banks. That is, 
banks, which disclosed the non-audit fees in their annual reports plus 10 banks, which responded 
the questionnaire survey (see Table 1). Note that sample sizes around 30 to 500 are appropriate 
most research (Sekaran, 2000, p. 296). For the present study, the sample consists of 66% of the to 
banks in Malaysia. 
TABLE 1 
Explanation of the Model 
This study is replicated from the previous studies in audit fees (see for example, ~utterworh and 
Houghton, 1995; Mohd Atef and Ayoib, 2000; Ayoib; 2001) and extended to accommodate th 
Malaysian environment and in particular the banking sector. As mentioned before, the authors use th 
Ordinary Least Squares to analyse the data. 
' According to the Economic Repon 1999 of the Ministry of Finance, the Malaysian economy had recoverrd in 
1999 from the severe deflationary impact of the regional financial crisis which had resulted in a 7.5% contraction 
of the economy in 1998. Other economic indicators such as Growth Domestic Products (GDP) also shotved 
increasing rate compared with 1998 
' The merger data is included in h e  main analysis; ho\trever it is excluded in the sensitivify analysis due lo (N 
study by Finh (2002) \tho found that the merger data influenced the significance of the results. The results 
similar. 
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esear~h model is as follows: 
LOGFEE = Po + PILOGASSETS + P,SQSUBS + P3ARTA + P 4 0 P I N I O ~  + PJAUDITOR + 
PdLOGNAS + P7FOREIGN + PsCOM + e 
measurements of the variables are as follows: 
endent Variable Measurement 
Natural log of total audit fees 
Natural log of the non-audit services fees 
endent Variables Measurement 
- Natural log of total assets 
- Square root of the number of consolidated subsidiaries 
- Account receivables to total assets (%) 
- Indicator variable having a value of 1 if the firm receives 
a "subject to" audit opinion and 0 otherwise 
- Indicator variable having a value of I if the auditor is the 
Big Five firm, and 0 otherwise - Indicator variable having a value of 1 if the bank is a 
foreign bank, and 0 if otherwise 
- Indicator variable having a value of I if the bank is a 
commercial bank, and 0 if merchant bank - Error term 
- Regression Coefficients 
ernent of Variables 
pendent variable. Under the Company Act 1965, audit fees are required to be 
d in the annual reports. Audit fees are measured by the dollar value of audit fees paid by the 
the auditor. Logarithmic transformation is used for analysis due to the fact that audit fees 
crease at a reducing rate with size.7 
iable. As with audit fees, the non-audit services fees charged to auditees are 
f non-audit services paid to the auditor by the bank. As mentioned before, 
SE listed companies to disclose the amount in their annual reports prior to 
audit fees, non-audit services fees are also transformed to correct non- 
rmality in the distribution of the data. 
here are a lot of findings, which prove that auditee size has a significant impact on the audit fees. In 
t, it may be said that auditee size has been found to be the most significant independent variable in 
ermining audit fees. In all studies of audit pricing, a positive relationship has been discovered 
ween audit fees and auditee size. Total assets are used in the present study due to the amount of 
the logarithmic transformation in the model of audit fees (see for 
, 1995; Mohd Atef and Ayoib, 2000; and Ayoib, 200 I). 
739 
assets, which are consistent before the 1997 crisis and thereafter compared to those of revenues 
addition, most of the previous studies used total assets to measure the auditee size. Consistent 
other studies, it is transformed to logarithmic data. It is expected that a positive relationship be, 
this independent variable and audit fees will take place. 
Complexity 
Complexity of the auditees influences the auditors' job due to more time allocated to d 
Therefore the more complex the banks as a whole, the more the audit fees charged by the audi 
For the present study, two variables are used as the proxy of the auditees' complexity 
numbers of subsidiaries measured by square root of the subsidiaries and second, the ratio ofacco 
receivables to total assets. Two proxies are needed to measure complexity due to 
measurement. Receivables are used instead of inventories because of the distinct nat 
which do not generally have any inventories (Rose, 1999). Specifically, in the present study, ite 
loan and advances, which are measuring within one year, are used for receivables as the pro 
complexity. 
Opinion 
Many studies have found that audit opinion has a significantly positive relationship with the audit 
(Palmrose, 1986a; Francis and Simon, 1987; and Houghton and Jubb, 1999). In the presen 
variable is a proxy for audit risk. Therefore it is assumed that the sign for the relationship betw 
auditor opinion and audit fees is positive. 
Auditor 
Studies show positive correlation between Big Five firms and audit fees (Palmrose, 1986a; Fr 
and Simon, 1987) in the United States market as well as in the Malaysian market (Rose, 1999, 
Ayoib, 2001). This is due to the reputation effect of the Big Five. Hence a positive relations 
between audit fees and auditor is expected. 
Foreign 
In Malaysia, two studies found that foreign companies were charged higher audit fees than other 
(Rose, 1999; and Ayoib, 2001). Foreign banks, which are multinational companies demand 
levels of audit quality to satisfy international investors and place more value on the interna 
reputations of the Big Six auditors than do domestic firms (Rose, 1999). Therefore, it is predictc 
foreign banks are positively correlated with audit fees. 
Commercial 
This new variable is introduced because banks are categorised into two types. First is the 
bank and the second is the merchant bank. The authors argue that commercial banks pay more 
fees than merchant banks other things being equal. There are three reasons for this: 
commercial banks in Malaysia have many branches. Therefore, the auditor needs comparatively 
time to audit the banks. Secondly the total assets of the commercial banks are likely to be more 
that of merchant banks. However, this aspect is already controlled by the size measure i 
Lastly, the transactions taking place in the commercial banks are likely to be more compl 
involves companies and also individuals while merchant banks usually involve companies 0 
The summary of the expected signs is revealed in Table 2. 
8 For example Afiin Bank's revenue fluctuated from 1996 to 2000 with ~~322,721,000,  RM414* 
RM290,844,000, RM323,202,000, and RM168,480,000, respectively. However, total assets appeared 
consistent from 1996 to 2000 with RM12,091,215,000, RM15,299,470,000, R h f 1 4 y 3 8 5 *  
RM 15,O I 1,699,000, and RM 15,643,85 1,000, respectively. 
TABLE 2 
VII. RESULTS 
"alitative Results and Descriptive Statistics 
erestingly, seven bankers said that long-time audit firms have not any influence on the provision of 
n-audit services. They also believe that the auditors do not rely more on the non-audit services than 












- Total of audit fees 
- Total of non-audit services fees 
- Total assets 
- Number of subsidiaries 
- Ratio oftotal receivables to total assets 
- Indicator variable having a value of 1 if the firm 
receive a "subject to" audit opinion and 0 otherwise 
- Indicator variable having a value of 1 if the 
auditor is the Big Five firm, and 0 otherwise 
- Indicator variable having a value of 1 if the bank is the 
foreign bank, and 0 otherwise 
- Indicator variable having a value of 1 if the bank is the 
Commercial bank, and 0 merchant banks. 
The average of total audit fees for the sample was RM190,612 as compared with mean for non-audit 
services fees of RM233,049. For subsidiaries and total receivables to total assets the averages were 
7.3 and 0.37, respectively. . . 
Interestingly, there are no banks that received qualified opinion and all their auditors are from the Big. 
Five firms except for one bank namely, the BSN Commercial Bank Berhad which hired Salleh, 
. . 
Leong, Azlan & Co. as its auditor. 
The audit fees range from RM8,000 to RM1,785,000. However, the non-audit fees range From 
RM1,OOO to RM5,500,000. It shows that the non-audit fees range is larger than audit fees, which 
means that the non-audit services offered by the auditors are quite diverse depending on the need of 
the individual bankers. 
In addition, as in findings of other studies, majority of the variables exhibited positive skewness. The 
skewness for audit fees, non-audit fees, total assets and number of subsidiaries and foreign variables 
are 4.403, 5.447, 2.374, 2.573, and 0.798, respectively. However, a negative skewness is found for 
total receivables to total assets, auditor and commercial variables with 4.253, -5.568 and -1.631, 
respectively. These results support other studies such as Chan et al. (1993), Firth (1997) and Ayoib 
(2001). For opinion, there is no computation due to all the banks receiving unqualified opinion. This 
is also consistent with previous studies in Malaysia (see, Ayoib, 2001). 
In addition, Pearson correlation coeficients (r) are also computed to determine the correlation 
between the independent variables. Correlations among the independent variables could possibly 
confound interpretation of the regressions (Firth, 1997). The results in Table 4, suggest that the largest 
absolute value is 0.668 between NAS and ASSETS, with significant level at 0.01. The high 
correlation is due to the fact that large firms tend to have large monetary attributes, not that there is. 
direct causal relationship between the variables (Pong and Whittington, 1994). Therefore, the Peason 
correlation coefficients are acceptable in all cases. Note that the omission of the size variable did not 
change the results. Furthermore, the largest of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 2.336 and the 
of all VlFs is 1.430. It shows that the multicollinearity do not pose a serious problem than can 
the regression analysis.9 
9 Sekaran (2000) suggests that multicollinerity is destructive if correlations between the independeTt 
variables are above 0.75. In addition, the largest VIF is not greater than 10 and the mean of all VIFs IS 
not larger than 2 (Neter, et al., 199 I). 
74 
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ircnn's Correlation among Inde~endent Variables 
.. - heOPMION variable is deleted from the analysis due to constant value (i.e. all values are 0's). 
i c  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) 
$ ,melation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
P 
linary Least Squares (OLS) Analysis 
k ~ a b l e  5, the adjusted R~ for the model of audit fee is 0.589 with an F value of 7.151 and is 
&ant at level of p < 0.0001. This reveals that 58.9% of the variance is significantly explained by 
independent variables. However, it was lower than other studies such as Francis and Simon 
Butterworth and Houghton (1995), Firth (1997), Mohd Atef and Ayoib (2000), and Ayoib 
001). This might be due to the higher number of independent variables used by other studies, and 
that the present study only uses banks in the sample. 
I authors also performed diagnostic tests related to two assumptions. The tests were carried out to 
hennine whether there is homoscedasticity in the Ordinary Least Squares ana~ysis '~ and whether 
be is any autocorrelation presence in the Ordinary Least Squares regression results." Two analyses 
ke employed. First is the Goldfield and Quandt analysis for the detection of heteroscedasticity, and i c  second is Durbin-Watson Model. The results showed that there are no heteroscedastieity and 
iUtocorrelation problems in the Ordinary Least Squares analysis. 
ccording to Lewis (1993), heterocedidasticity refers to the situation in which contrary to the assumption of 
loscedasticity, the error term in a regression model does not have constant variance. 
cwis (1993) states that autocorrelation refers to a situation whereby error terms associated with different 
:Nations are correlated. 
TABLE 5 
[ Indepenc 














Adjusted R~ 0.589 
F- Ratio 7.151 
Significant F 0.000~ 
Notes: 
a.Dependent Variable: LOGFEE ,I 
b.Predictors: LOGNAS, LOGASSETS, SQSUBS, ARTA, AUDITOR, FOREIGN, COM Consmt 
The OPINION variable is deleted from the analysis due to constant value (i.e. all values are 0's) 
**** significant at 0.001 level (1-tailed) 







Interestingly, the result for LOGNAS is negative and significant at 0.05 levels. This rtsufl 
consistent with the theories. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected. To our knowledge, thj 
the first study that found significant negative relationship between audit and non-audit fees. (4 
Similarly, for the primary independent variables such as auditee size and complexity (proxied 
LOGASSETS, SUBS), the results show significant coefficients. These results are also consistent v 
previous studies. In addition, FOREIGN variable is also significantly positive relationship with I I  
fees. This shows that foreign banks pay the auditors more than that of the local banks. This b I 








On the other hand ARTA, AUDITOR and COM are not statistically significant. AUDITOR ir 
significant due to lack of data when only one bank hired non-Big Five-audit firm while ARTA 1 
COM are not significant probably due to the banking sector being different from other sectors 
commercial bank are not being significantly different from other type of banks. Sensitivity anal) 
show that the results of the hypothesis variable are mostly similar although the statistical signifia 
of some other variables changed somewhat. Finally, OPINION could not be tested since all ~ J U  
reports were provided with the unqualified opinions. 
-1.675 
d a d  . , 
1.822 0 . 0 4 3  
1 0.573 0.286 
-0.737 > 
I 813 I 
Discussion 3 
The hypothesis variable LOGNAS showed a significantly negative relationship with the audit fc 
This is consistent with the theory regarding knowledge spillover and trade off between audit f e i  
other fees as discussed earlier and other studies (see for example, Simunic, 1984). Also, the rcS 
were not sensitive to different measurement and sample (for example by excluding merger dam).' 
shows that non-audit fees variable has significantly negative relationship with the audit fees. : 
MFA'S sM ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM, 23RD-24TH APRIL 2003 4: -  
there are two explanations for the negative relationship, It cannot be ascertained as to which 
ition might influence the results. If it is due to the knowledge-spillover effect, it should thus be 
come for it may be concluded that the performance of non-audit services by the auditors has led to 
on the part of the companies audited. However, if the negative relationship is caused by 
,t acting as a "loss leader", there would be much doubt' as to the independence of the auditor in 
ductkg the audit. It is suggested that future research to analyse whether the relationship is due to 
enomenon of knowledge spillover or that of the loss leader. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
rement of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Listing Requirements regarding disclosure of 
fees paid to auditors in annual reports gives rise to the question that this matter of non-audit 
may be critical. The present study sought to look into this matter by analysing the relationship 
een non-audit fees and audit fees. However, it is not the purpose of this research to check on 
her the independence of auditors is seriously reduced when they provide non-audit services to 
general, the study reveals that non-audit fees have strong negative relationship with audit fees. This 
ds to a couple of implications that should be of concern to the policy makers and researchers. The 
!icy makers should focus more closely on the non-audit services given by auditors - whether or not 
erger has taken place. This is because audit firms may be taking advantage of increasing their 
come by hiking non-audit services fees and reducing the audit fees. Lack of independence might 
bsequently occur. However, further research should be carried out to examine this issue. 
uture research studying the relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees should also cover 
her sectors with the latest data and larger sample size. This research may also cover a longer period 
. In addition, other variables such as return on equity, debt ratio, specialisation of the auditor 
be included due to the lower explanatory power found in this study. Finally, comparative 
les between countries could also be a good idea to clarify the situation in Malaysia vis-8-vis that 
ese fmdings are subject to several limitations. First, in terms of generalisability due to the small 
ple size, single-period data and the focus on the banking sector, which might be different fiom 
ther sectors. Second, its low explanatory power as compared to other studies shows that there are 
ther factors that are not captured by the model. Lastly, some of the banks did not return the 
questionnaires and therefore they had been left out of the survey. The results will be clearer if the data 
ofnon-audit services fees from all the banks could be collected. 
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